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verify_hash_signature

Function verify_hash_signature 

Source
pub fn verify_hash_signature(
    data_hash: &[u8],
    signature: &[u8],
    public_key_hash: &[u8],
    platform_version: &PlatformVersion,
) -> Result<Result<(), Error>, ProtocolError>
Expand description

Checks that signature, a 65-byte compact recoverable ECDSA signature over data_hash, was made by the key whose HASH160 is public_key_hash, by recovering the key: an ECDSA_HASH160 identity key, a P2PKH address witness, an asset lock’s one-time key.

Recovery alone leaves a third party two ways to turn a valid signature into another valid one, and so to change the hash of the transition carrying it:

  • it takes any S, so the signature stays valid with S replaced by n - S and the recovery id’s parity flipped;
  • it hashes the recovered key in its compressed form whatever the header says, so the signature stays valid with its header rewritten from 31 + id (a compressed key) to 27 + id (an uncompressed one).

§Parameters

  • data_hash: the 32-byte digest that was signed.
  • signature: the compact recoverable signature.
  • public_key_hash: the HASH160 of the compressed public key expected to have signed.
  • platform_version: selects the rule through dpp.state_transition_method_versions.verify_hash_signature. 0 is dashcore::signer::verify_hash_signature, which accepts both rewrites (protocol versions 1 to 14); 1 also refuses a high-S signature and a header that does not name a compressed key.

§Returns

Ok(Ok(())) when the signature is valid, Ok(Err(_)) with the reason when it is not, and Err(ProtocolError::UnknownVersionMismatch) for a version this build does not know.